Read The Alternating Double Auction Market: A Game Theoretic and Experimental Investigation

The Alternating Double Auction Market: A Game Theoretic and Experimental Investigation

Abdolkarim Sadrieh

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Description:The alternating double auction market institution is presented as a discrete time version of the open outcry market. The game in extensive form is analyzed in an almost perfect information setting, using the concept of subgame perfectness. By applying two new equilibrium selection criteria, a general existence result is obtained for "impatience equilibria" of the game. All such equilibria are shown to have unique properties concerning the traded quantities and prices. The most important results are that the equilibrium prices are independent of the number of traders and are always very close to - if not inside - the range of competitive prices. The latter can be evaluated as game theoretic support for the convergence of prices to the competitive price. The process of price formation is traced by applying the learning direction theory and introducing the "anchor price hypothesis."We have made it easy for you to find a PDF Ebooks without any digging. And by having access to our ebooks online or by storing it on your computer, you have convenient answers with The Alternating Double Auction Market: A Game Theoretic and Experimental Investigation. To get started finding The Alternating Double Auction Market: A Game Theoretic and Experimental Investigation, you are right to find our website which has a comprehensive collection of manuals listed.
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Pages: —

Format: PDF, EPUB & Kindle Edition

Publisher: —

Release: 1998

ISBN: 3642589545

Description: The alternating double auction market institution is presented as a discrete time version of the open outcry market. The game in extensive form is analyzed in an almost perfect information setting, using the concept of subgame perfectness. By applying two new equilibrium selection criteria, a general existence result is obtained for "impatience equilibria" of the game. All such equilibria are shown to have unique properties concerning the traded quantities and prices. The most important results are that the equilibrium prices are independent of the number of traders and are always very close to - if not inside - the range of competitive prices. The latter can be evaluated as game theoretic support for the convergence of prices to the competitive price. The process of price formation is traced by applying the learning direction theory and introducing the "anchor price hypothesis."We have made it easy for you to find a PDF Ebooks without any digging. And by having access to our ebooks online or by storing it on your computer, you have convenient answers with The Alternating Double Auction Market: A Game Theoretic and Experimental Investigation. To get started finding The Alternating Double Auction Market: A Game Theoretic and Experimental Investigation, you are right to find our website which has a comprehensive collection of manuals listed.
Our library is the biggest of these that have literally hundreds of thousands of different products represented.

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The Alternating Double Auction Market: A Game Theoretic and Experimental Investigation

The Alternating Double Auction Market: A Game Theoretic and Experimental Investigation

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